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FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1382
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 8346
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 8962
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 334
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 2238
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1886
RUMJPS/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 756
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 5790
BT
C E C R E T KUALA LUMPUR 7433 COMBINED SECTION
EXDIS

INFO: 12065: RDS-1 11/10/11 (PALMER, RONALD D.) OR-M
TAGS: US, CA, MY
SUBJECT: HOLDRIDGE CONVERSATION WITH MALAYSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: STATE 294427

IS (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

IS SUMMARY: DURING A BRIEF STOPOVER IN KUALA LUMPUR NOVEMBER
07: ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE MET WITH MALAYSIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER GHAZALI SHAFIE ON NOVEMBER 6 AND DISCUSSED US/PRC
RELATIONS, KAMPUCHEA, AND SEVERAL OTHER TOPICS. HOLDRIDGE
DESCRIBED CURRENT US/PRC RELATIONS AS QUOTE DIFFICULT UNQUOTE
MAINLY AS A RESULT OF CONFLICTING VIEWS ON ARMS SALES TO
VIETNAM AS A RESULT IT WAS UNLIKELY THERE WOULD BE ANY ARMS

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State Dept. review completed

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SALES TO CHINA OR ANY QUOTE QUANTUM JUMP UNQUOTE IN THE
BILATERAL REALTIONSHIP IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOLDRIDGE
REASSURED GHAZALI THAT WHILE THE US VALUES ITS TIES WITH
BEIJING FOR STRATEGIC REASONS, THAT RELATIONSHIP DOES
NOT TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER OUR TIES WITH ASEAN. GHAZALI
WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE ASSURANCES, BUT NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE
UNFORTUNATE FROM A STRATEGIC STANDPOINT, IF US/PRC RELATIONS
WERE TO RETROGRESS.

3. GHAZALI REITERATED HIS STRONG PITCH FOR US ASSISTANCE IN
CREATING AND PROVIDING QUOTE BEEF AND TEETH UNQUOTE TO A
THIRD FORCE IN KAMPUCHEA. HE SAID THAT ALL ASEAN COUNTRIES
SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A NEED FOR A THIRD FORCE, BUT
THEY ALL COULD NOT BE COUNTED ON TO ASSIST. THE
INDONESIANS DON'T BELIEVE THAT SON SANN IS VIABLE OR CAN
BE BUILT UP AS A THIRD FORCE AND THE THAIS ARE
HESITANT TO BECOME INVOLVED FOR FEAR OF VIETNAMESE AND
CHINESE REACTION. MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, ACCORDING TO
GHAZALI, ARE READY TO BE USED BUT LACK THE WHEREWITHALL.
HE SAID AS LONG AS THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT A THIRD FORCE
WAS DESIRABLE, A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO BUILD IT UP.
GHAZALI PRESSED FOR A US RESPONSE AND STRESSED
THAT IF THE US COULD NOT BE HELPFUL, MALAYSIA WOULD HAVE
TO LOOK TO OTHER OPTIONS.

4. THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE HAIG VISIT TO KUALA
LUMPUR NEXT YEAR IN CONNECTION WITH THE ASEAN MEETING IN
SINGAPORE AND OF A VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR TO
THE US NEXT YEAR OR LATER. END SUMMARY.

5. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER
GHAZALI SHAFIE ON NOVEMBER 6. ALSO PRESENT WERE AMBASSADOR
PALMER, POLCOUNS ZINOMAN, MFA SEC GEN ZAKARIA, AND OTHER
MALAYSIAN OFFICIALS. GHAZALI WARMLY WELCOMED HOLDRIDGE
AND APOLOGIEZED FOR THE INABILITY TO ARRANGE A CALL ON THE
PRIME MINISTER AS A RESULT OF AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL
MEETING.

6. HOLDRIDGE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED SEMINAR HE HAD JUST ATTENDED
IN BALI AND BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF BENNY MURDAN'S VIEWS ON
THE KAMPUCHEAN SITUATION, WHICH VIEWS, HE SAID, WERE NOT

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SHARED BY INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. MURDANI'S VIEW, ACCORDING TO HOLDRIDGE, WOULD NEVER WORK BECAUSE CHINA WOULD NEVER ACCEPT IT. THIS WOULD ALSO ASSURE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD REMAIN IN THE REGION. HOLDRIDGE REVEALED THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO BUILD UP THEIR OWN INFLUENCE IN INDOCHINA, INDEPENDENT OF HANOI. HE PARTICULARLY POINTED TO LARGE NUMBERS OF LAO AND CAMBODIANS BEING TAKEN FOR STUDY TO THE USSR AND RECENT INDICATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET AIRFIELD ON THE PLAIN OF JARS IN LAOS.

7. US/CHINA RELATIONS. HOLDRIDGE SAID THAT ONE IMPORTANT PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP WAS TO REASSURE THE INDONEISANS, SINGAPOREANS AND MALAYSIANS THAT WHILE FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES THE US VALUES ITS TIES WITH BEIJING, THAT RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER OUR TIES WITH ASEAN. AT THE ICK IN JULY, HOLDRIDGE SAID THAT THE US WORKED HARD TO COME UP WITH A COMPROMISE, BUT HE TOLD HAN NIENLUNG AT THE TIME THAT IF QUOTE PUSH CAME TO SHOVE UNQUOTE WE WOULD STICK WITH ASEAN.

8. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SALE OF US ARMS TO CHINA, HOLDRIDGE SAID THERE ARE DEFINITE PROBLEMS. DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA POINTED TO BEIJING'S NINE POINT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN AND SAID THAT CHINA IN EFFECT HAD NOW MADE THE PLEDGE WHICH THE US HAS REQUESTED OF QUOTE PUBLICLY ESCHEWING THE USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE IN DEALING WITH THE TAIWAN QUESTION. IN LIGHT OF THIS, HE SAID, THE US SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS POLICY TOWARD ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. IF THIS PROBLEM WERE NOT RESOLVED, THE CHINESE INDICATED THAT THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP COULD RETROGRESS. FOLLOWING TWO DAYS OF INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS, THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THE MATTER AT A TIME, PLACE AND LEVEL TO BE DETERMINED. ASIDE FROM THIS, THERE MAY BE SOME HIGH-LEVEL US VISITS TO CHINA IN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. HOLDRIDGE CONCLUDED THAT RELATIONS COULD NOW BE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE DIFFICULT UNQUOTE AND HE CERTAINLY WOULDN'T EXPECT ANY QUANTUM JUMP FORWARD IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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9. AT ANY RATE, HOLDRIDGE SAID SECRETARY HAIG HAD ALREADY MADE IT PLAIN THAT ON THE ISSUE OF ARMS SALES, THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. ANY ARMS SALES, IF MADE, WOULD ONLY BE OF A DEFENSIVE NATURE AND CARRIED OUT ON A CAREFUL CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ALSO LIMITE THE POSSIBILITIES. THE CHINESE WERE RECENTLY NEGOTIATING WITH THE FRENCH TO BUY A WIRE-GUIDED ANTI-TANK MISSILE. TO THE CHAGRIN OF THE FRENCH, THE CHINESE ULTIMATELY ASKED FOR ONE PROTOTYPE MISSILE AND THE BLUEPRINTS.

10. HOLDRIDGE NOTED THAT THIS NEW QUOTE PRINCIPLED UNQUOTE AND INFLEXIBLE POSITION ON THE PART OF BEIJING MAY REFLECT DIFFICULTIES TENG HSIAOPING IS HAVING WITHIN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP. HE MAY BE UNDER FIRE ON TAIWAN.

11. ON KAMPUCHEA ALSO, HOLDRIDGE SAID WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF BEIJING. HUANG HUA RECENTLY TOLD HIM THAT THE PROBLEM WITH SON SANN IS THAT HE DEMANDS TOO MUCH. IN REPLY TO OUR URGING THAT PRC ALLAY ASEAN'S SUSPICIONS OF CHINA, HUANG HUA MERELY SHRUGGED.

12. GHAZALI WAS VISIBLY ENCOURAGED BY THESE ASSURANCES AND SAID HE WOULD PASS THESE ON TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE DID ADD, HOWEVER, THAT ANY RETROGRESSION IN US/PRC RELATIONS WOULD BE A SETBACK FROM A STRATEGIC STANDPOINT AND WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE.

13. KAMPUCHEA. HOLDRIDGE ASKED GHAZALI ABOUT HIS VIEWS AS TO WHAT TO DO WITH THE KPNLF AND ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SON SANN'S RECENTLY ANNOUNCED REFUSAL TO BECOME PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN ANY COALITION GOVERNMENT. GHAZALI SAID IT APPEARED THAT SON SANN WAS NOW QUOTE PUTTING UNQUOTE AND WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE TALKS IN BANGKOK. HOLDRIDGE NOTED A LETTER WHICH HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM SON SANN (REFTEL) INDICATING HE STILL SEEMED PREPARED TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE. GHAZALI SAID THAT SON SANN HAS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR ONLY ONE MORE MONTH AND THE THAIS ARE QUOTE CROSS UNQUOTE WITH HIM AND ARE NOT BEING SUPPORTIVE.

14. HOLDRIDGE AGREED SON SANN SEEMED TO HAVE A PROBLEM WITH

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THE THAI BECAUSE THE THAI SEEM TO BE PUSHING VERY HARD FOR THE FORMATION OF A COALITION OF THE THREE FACTIONS, WHEREAS MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE SEEM MORE SATISFIED TO SEE SON SANN OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY. GHAZALI SAID THERE ARE THREE CONFLICTING GROUPS IN THE THAI LEADERSHIP, SITTI/KASSEM, SUPREME COMMAND/SAIYUD AND PRASONG OF THE NSC AND THIS RESULTS IN PREM'S CONFUSION ON KAMPUCHEA. THE SITTI/KASSEM FACTION IS ANXIOUS FOR A COALITION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT LEGALLY THROUGH AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED AND ACCEPTED KHMER GROUP. THE SAIYUD FACTION IS LESS CONCERNED WITH LEGALITIES, IS CONTENT WITH CURRENT SITUATION BUT SAYS RTG MUST AVOID GETTING INVOLVED FOR FEAR OF GETTING A BLOODY NOSE FROM THE VIETNAMESE. THE PRASONG FACTION THINKS IN TERMS OF A SOCIALIST KAMPUCHEA DOMINATED BY THE KHMER ROUGE, (WITH POL POT ETC. KICKED OUT), BUT WITH NO CHINESE OR SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. A KEY ELEMENT IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, ACCORDING TO GHAZALI, IS THAT SITTI IS UNDER FIRE FROM THE MILITARY FOR NOT KEEPING THEM BETTER INFORMED. GHAZALI SAID HE IS HOPING TO GO TO BANGKOK IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO GET A BETTER READING OF THAI THINKING.

15. HOLDRIDGE SAID THE US WISHES TO BE SUPPORTATIVE OF ASEAN, BUT ARE NOT CERTAIN WHAT TO SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT ASIDE FROM QUOTE POLITICAL AND MORAL UNQUOTE AID WE HAVE RECENTLY INCREASED OUR HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AT THE BORDER BY ONE MILLION DOLLARS AND RAISED FMS CREDITS TO THAILAND BY \$3.8 MILLION. (GHAZALI LAUGHED THAT QUOTE POLITICAL AND MORAL UNQUOTE SUPPORT SOUNDED LIKE THE WAY IN WHICH THE CHINESE PREMIER RECENTLY DESCRIBED CHINA'S CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY.)

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16. GHAZALI SAID THAT MALAYSIA -- THAT IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL LED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND NOT JUST GHAZALI SHAFIE -- IS ANXIOUS TO CREATE A ZONE OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND NEUTRALITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. TO THAT END, MALAYSIA HAS WORKED HARD FOR THE UN RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA WHICH IF IMPLEMENTED WOULD ACHIEVE THAT END. BUT IN ORDER TO BRING

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THE POLITICAL SITUATION INTO EXISTENCE WHICH IS CONTEMPLATED IN THE UN RESOLUTION, THERE MUST BE SOMEONE, OTHER THAN THE KHMER ROUGE, TO TALK TO. IF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE THIRD FORCE IS ACCEPTED, THEN THE QUESTION IS HOW TO BUILD IT UP, TO ADD QUOTE BEEF AND TEETH. UNQUOTE ASEAN SUCCESS AT THE UN PROVIDES ANOTHER YEAR TO ACCOMPLISH THAT. THE THAIS SAY THAT THEY CAN'T TRAIN OR ARM THE THIRD FORCE. IF THE KHMER THIRD FORCE CAN'T BE SUPPLIED THROUGH THAILAND, PERHAPS IT CAN BE SUPPLIED THROUGH THE AIR. WE CAN FIND A WAY. THE POINT IS THAT ALL ASEAN IS AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A THIRD FORCE. THERE ARE DISAGREEMENTS ON WHETHER SON SANN IS VIABLE OF WHETHER HE CAN BE BUILT UP. WE DON'T HAVE THE CAPABILITY OURSELVES TO BUILD UP SON SANN SO WE COME AND TALK WITH YOU. IF YOU SAY NO, THEN WE WILL HAVE TO THINK OF ANOTHER OPTION, GHAZALI STATED.

17. GHAZALI SAID MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE ARE QUITE WILLING TO BE USED BUT WE DON'T HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL. HE SAID ADDITIONALLY THE INDONESIAN PROBLEM WAS COMPLICATED BECAUSE OF INDONESIAN-VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATIONS OVER BORDER DELIMITATION IN THE REGION OF NATUNA ISLAND. INDEED, HE SAID THAT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS APPEAR TO BE GOING WELL FROM THE INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE AND MUST BE KEPT IN MIND WHEN ASSESSING THE INDONESIAN LINE ON KAMPUCHEA. (FYI: AS AN ASIDE TO ILLUSTRATE THE CLOSENESS OF ASEAN COORDINATION, GHAZALI SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN TALKING TO BENNY MURDANI ABOUT TRYING TO SOLVE THE TIMOR PROBLEM. HE HAS SUGGESTED TO MURDANI THAT TIMORESE GOLKAR CANDIDATES ISSUE A MANIFESTO STATING THEIR DESIRE FOR A RECONCILIATION OF TIMORESE PEOPLE WITH THE INDONESIANS. GHAZALI SAID THAT OUTSIDE OBSERVERS THEN SHOULD BE INVITED TO SEE IF THE ELECTIONS ARE FAIR AND HE HAD OFFERED HIMSELF TO GO TO THE DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF THE INDONESIANS TO ASK THAT THE TIMOR ISSUE BE STRUCK OFF THE AGENDA. END FYI)

18. HOLDRIDGE STRESSED A POINT WHICH KISSINGER, DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO KUALA LUMPUR, HAD MADE TO THE MALAYSIANS AND. THERE CONTINUES TO BE GREAT SENSITIVITIES IN THE US TO MILITARY REINVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. GHAZALI RETORTED THAT SUCH SUPPORT NEEDN'T BE MADE PUBLIC AND IN THAT CASE SHOULD BE LEFT TO QUOTE PROFESSIONALS UNQUOTE (INTELLIGENCE AGENTS). HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE US AND MEMBERS

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OF ASEAN TO DECIDE TO BUILD UP THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL CAPABILITY OF THE THIRD FORCE IT MUST BE DONE RIGHT; NO HALF-WAY ACTIONS. IF IT WERE NOT DONE RIGHT IT COULD RESULT IN A GREAT DEAL MORE SUFFERING FOR THE COMBODIANS. HE SAID THAT HE HOPES THE US CAN AGREE ON THIS PRINCIPLE OF PROVIDING THE THIRD FORCE WHAT IT NEEDS TO BECOME POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY VIABLE. IF NOT, HE REITERATED HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT BACK TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND MALAYSIA WOULD HAVE TO SEEK OTHER ALTERNATIVES.

19. HOLDRIDGE CAUTIONED GHAZALI TO AVOID BEING PRECIPITATE. HE NOTED THAT THERE IS NO URGENCY TO THE SITUATION NOW AND HE HAD TOLD MURDANI SO RECENTLY IN INDONESIA. THE VIETNAMESE ARE FEELING THE HEAT. THEY SEEM TO BE VERY SENSITIVE TO THEIR GROWING INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND TO THE ECONOMIC PINCH THEY ARE IN. THE FACT THAT THE PARTY CONGRESS WAS JUST POSTPONED MAY INDICATE THAT THERE IS DEBATE GOING ON AMONG THE LEADERSHIP. THE SITUATION IS NOT AN ECONOMIC BURDEN TO ANY OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES.

20. AMBASSADOR PALMER NOTED TO GHAZALI THAT IT MIGHT MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO THE US IF THERE WERE A GENERAL ASEAN POLICY COALESCING AROUND THE THIRD FORCE IDEA. GHAZALI SAID THAT A COMMON POLICY WILL NOT COME INTO EXISTENCE. THERE IS, HE CONTINUED, ALREADY AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE, BUT AN AGREED UPON POLICY FOR ACTION, INCLUDING A DIVISION OF LABOR WILL NOT HAPPEN. MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE ARE READY TO BECOME INVOLVED. FOR THE TIME BEING, THE THAIS HAVE TO CONTINUE TO PLAY ALONG WITH THE CHINESE AND THE KH AND THEY ARE AFRAID OF THE ANGER OF THE VIETNAMESE. HOLDRIDGE ADDED THAT THE THAIS ARE NOT BLIND TO THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN DEALING WITH THE CHINESE, BUT FOR THE MOMENT HAVE NO CHOICE. GHAZALI SAID THAT THE THAIS HAVE TOLD HIM THAT THE THAI COMMUNIST PARTY GET THEIR ARMS INDIRECTLY FROM THE CHINESE THROUGH THE KHMER ROUGH. WITH A THIRD FORCE, GHAZALI SAID, THE THAIS WILL HAVE LESS NEED TO RELY ON CHINA TO RELIEVE VIETNAMESE PRESSURE.

21. HOLDRIDGE SAID IT APPEARED SON SANN WAS COMING TO WASHINGTON. HE ADDED THAT THE US TRIED TO GIVE SON SANN VISIBILITY AND COVERAGE DURING HIS LAST VISIT AND THIS HAD HAD THE UNDESIRABLE EFFECT OF ACTIVATING SIHANOUK. BOTH HOLDRIDGE AND GHAZALI AGREED THAT SIHANOUK MIGHT STILL HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY. HOLDRIDGE THANKED GHAZALI FOR HIS THOUGHT ON

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KAMPUCHEA AND SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSIDER HOW HE CAN BE HELPFUL. GHAZALI REPLIED THAT HE APPRECIATED US ASSURANCES, BUT AT SOME POINT WOULD LIKE SOME INDICATIONS AS TO US INTENTIONS. HOLDRIDGE NOTED THAT GHAZALI WOULD SOON BE IN WASHINGTON AND THAT APPOINTMENTS WERE BEING SOUGHT FOR HIM WITH SEVENTH FLOOR PRINCIPALS SO THAT THE DIALOGUE COULD CONTINUE.

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22. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. GHAZALI BROUGHT UP THE IDEA OF POSSIBLE JAPANESE ASSISTANCE TO ASEAN COUNTRIES IN THE NAVAL FIELD, PARTICULARLY RE DEFENDING THE SEA LANES. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US NAVY COULD NOT PLAY A ROLE IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR COASTAL AREAS BUT HERE IS WHERE JAPAN MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY A ROLE. IF THE JAPANESE COULD PROVIDE THE WHEREWITHAL TO THE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO CARRY OUT THIS PATROLLING FUNCTION, IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. HE FELT THAT THE PROVISION OF MATERIEL WOULD NOT RUN INTO CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN JAPAN.

23. HOLDRIDGE SAID THAT FMS AND IMET PROGRAMS FOR MALAYSIA ARE IN GOOD SHAPE. THEY SHOULD CONTINUE AT EXISTING OR HIGHER LEVELS. GHAZALI SAID HE WAS VERY SATISFIED WITH THE TRAINING AND MATERIAL PROVIDED BY THE US. HOLDRIDGE MENTIONED THAT WHEN HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING SPACES FOR MALAYSIANS AND INDONESIANS AT THE COAST GUARD ACADEMY.

24. HAIG TO K.L. AND MAHATHIR TO WASHINGTON. HOLDRIDGE MENTIONED THAT SECRETARY HAIG WOULD BE COMING TO THE ASEAN MEETING IN SINGAPORE NEXT YEAR AND SAID HE HAD RECOMMENDED THE SECRETARY COME TO KUALA LUMPUR AS WELL. GHAZALI SAID THAT IF HE SEES THE SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON, HE WILL ISSUE AN INVITATION. AMBASSADOR PALMER BROUGHT UP THE POSSIBILITY OF PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR GOING TO THE US AT SOME POINT. GHAZALI SAID THAT THE FIRST HALF OF 1982 MIGHT BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ELECTIONS. HOLDRIDGE SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE SOMETHING IN CONNECTION WITH NEXT YEAR'S U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY BUT GHAZALI REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE PRIME MINISTER

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WERE SPECIALLY INVITED. HE ALLUDED TO MALAYSIAN PROBLEMS WITH
THE BRITISH AND IMPLIED THAT A MAHATHIR VISIT TO THE US
WOULD BENEFIT FROM CAREFUL PLANNING AND EXECUTION.

25. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO CINCPAC.
PALMER

END OF MESSAGE

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